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Abstract
FIGHTING WORDS: APPLICATIONS IN MODERN RACIAL 
CONTEXTS
Maure Gildea
The notion of “fighting words” was established in the benchmark 
case Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which chronicled how 
Chaplinsky, a proselytizing Jehovah’s witness, called the city 
marshal a “God damned racketeer”  and a “damned fascist,” 
and was convicted for violating a state statute forbidding 
individuals from addressing others in an offensive way.  The 
New Hampshire statute and the Chaplinsky ruling established 
a new framework for classifying speech as fighting words, 
which are not constitutionally protected speech. For speech to 
be considered fighting words, it must satisfy three criteria: The 
speech must be individually addressed and incite immediate 
violence in an average addressee. This essay explores the 
fighting words doctrine as presently constructed, determines that 
the criterion regarding an “average addressee” is particularly 
problematic, and suggests that the doctrine be altered to include 
specific demographics such as race. First, opposing viewpoints 
in favor of the current doctrine, including maintaining a 
high level of protection of free speech and avoiding issues 
regarding content-based speech restrictions, are discussed. 
These arguments are rebutted to conclude that the doctrine 
has only adverse effects. The latter portion of the essay argues 
that the case Miller v. California provides legal precedent for 
altering the fighting words doctrine, so that specific contexts 
are considered. It also contends that doing so aligns with both 
the contemporary social zeitgeist and the state’s key interests.
Maure Gildea is a third-year Political Science major with a 
concentration in Global Politics. She is minoring in Law and 
Society, as well as German. After graduating next year as a 
member of the Class of 2019, she plans to volunteer abroad 
and later attend graduate school for International Affairs.
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history, contemporary standards, and potential benefits, the 
fighting words doctrine should expand its scope by allowing 
specific demographics, such as race, to be taken into account.
The Status Quo
Proponents of the fighting words doctrine, notably traditionalists, 
assert the importance of maintaining the status quo regarding 
fighting words and the current level of constitutional protection 
that the doctrine affords to certain speech. As it is, the doctrine 
is highly protective of speech, in the sense that it is nearly 
impossible to argue that specific speech would satisfy all three 
criteria, particularly the criterion which regards an “average 
addressee.” Placing further restrictions on fighting words speech 
would thus make the speech less protected, and more speech 
would likely lose its constitutional protection. This results 
in somewhat of a chilling effect. Since the doctrine would 
ultimately be less protective of speech, those making speech 
such as racial commentary or criticism may fear that their speech 
could be conflated or construed as a verbal attack on a racial 
demographic. Rather than face potential legal repercussions 
for making the speech, an individual may choose to not make 
the speech at all. Avoiding this type of self-censorship is a key 
interest of the state, as the state – both by law and in practice – 
aims to uphold the First Amendment to encourage a “marketplace 
of ideas.”3 Referenced in Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams 
v. United States, the marketplace of ideas is encapsulated by 
the notion that only by competing with other ideas, claims, or 
speech can truth be found.4 Essentially, if an expansion in the 
scope of the fighting words doctrine leads to a chilling effect, 
it is less likely that ideas will be compared and the truth will 
be discovered – or that knowledge will be advanced for all.
Another reason that the status quo regarding fighting 
3  op. cit., fn. 1
4  Ibid.
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Interpreting Fighting Words
Freedom of speech is a key tenet of American society and 
government, and restrictions on speech are understandably 
hotly contested. Among the various types of speech that are 
not constitutionally protected, fighting words cases are the 
least prevalent. “Fighting words” are defined as speech that is 
individually addressed to an average addressee and would incite 
immediate violence towards the person making the speech. 
The primary reason that fighting words cases are so rare is 
that there is no speech that would be universally regarded as 
so heinous that anyone would reasonably expect individuals 
to respond violently. Of these criterion, the most problematic 
is the second, which specifies an “average addressee.” 
For speech to be considered fighting words, it would 
have to be universally regarded as so offensive as to incite 
violence, regardless of the individual addressee’s identifiable 
characteristics. At the time of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire in 
1942, calling an individual a “God damned racketeer”1 and “a 
damned Fascist”2 was considered so offensive as to incite violence 
against the speaker, yet today this would not be the case. However, 
speech that is biased against a specific demographic, such as 
race, could, by today’s standards, understandably be responded 
to with violence; still, according to the aforementioned criteria, 
the speech would qualify as constitutionally protected. Thus, 
the fighting words doctrine – as presently constructed – fails to 
establish a class of speech which ought not to be constitutionally 
protected. Mainly, it is universally inapplicable to most speech 
and simultaneously so narrow in its scope that it fails to 
provide a legal standard for the punishment of unconstitutional 
speech. Considering these inadequacies as well as prior case 
1  Steven H. Shiffrin and Jesse H. Choper, The First Amendment, Cases–Comments–Questions, 
5th Edition (Saint Paul, Minnesota: West Academic Publishing, 2011).
2  Ibid.
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protected. Similar to the problematic criterion of the fighting 
words doctrine, the first standard of the Miller Test seeks 
to determine if an average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, would find that the work, taken as whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest.7 Here is a prime example of 
a precedent for rulings which are based upon the meaning 
derived from the specific content of a work. The key issue with 
the fighting words doctrine is that its scope is so broad that it 
has the unfortunate effect of limiting what can be considered 
fighting words. If an individual makes a specific racial slur 
towards another person, it is reasonable that the addressee 
might react violently toward the speaker. However, it is not 
necessarily reasonable to expect that someone of a different 
racial group would react violently as well. Nevertheless, 
under the current fighting words doctrine – though the first 
addressee’s actions might be a perfectly reasonable response 
– the individual’s speech would be constitutionally protected, 
since the racially-targeted speech would not universally result 
in violence. Applying the criterion of contemporary community 
standards emphasizes the notion that experiences are contextual, 
not universal, and recognizes that values and standards 
regarding what is offensive may not be or remain the same.
Additionally, the fighting words doctrine should 
take specific demographics like race into account due to the 
contemporary social climate. As mentioned previously, calling 
someone a “God damned racketeer”8 would not, by today’s 
social standards, be considered so insulting that someone would 
reasonably react violently towards the speaker. It is difficult to 
think of many utterances that would incite violence now, likely 
due to how the nature of discourse itself has changed. Over 
time, language has become both less formal and more callous, 
7  Ibid.
8  op. cit., fn. 1
words should be maintained, according to opposing viewpoints, 
is that prior case history illustrates that the government cannot 
regulate speech based on its specific content. One case that 
demonstrates this is R.A.V. v. St. Paul. The U.S. Supreme 
Court ultimately reversed the decision of lower courts, 
ruling that the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance was 
unconstitutional in its regulation of the content of speech. 
Under the ordinance, displaying a symbol or object that 
would cause anger or alarm based on demographics such 
as race was considered a misdemeanor.5 The issue with the 
ordinance, according to Justice Scalia, was its effect: one side 
of the debate was being forced to fight under “the Marquis of 
Queensbury Rules.”6 In other words, the ordinance essentially 
gave one side of a debate regarding demographics like race a 
certain advantage. For example, in a debate, minority groups 
might have had an advantage because the ordinance targeted 
racism, and they would thus have special protections that others 
did not. In effect, the government would be biased towards 
certain viewpoints – endorsing some while condemning others 
– resulting in viewpoint discrimination. Ultimately, further 
regulating the content of fighting words speech would also have 
the effect of increasing self-censorship, since the government 
would establish the primacy of certain viewpoints over others.
Fighting Words and Contemporary Standards
Despite these objections, specific demographics such as race 
should be considered under the fighting words doctrine. Prior 
cases provide evidence that content-based rulings are both 
possible and supported by legal precedent. In Miller v. California, 
a Supreme Court case regarding sexually explicit speech, the 
Miller Test was established to distinguish between obscene 
and non-obscene speech – the former is not constitutionally 
5  Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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with the prospect of legal repercussions for using racially-
inflammatory speech that would incite violence, they would be 
less incentivized to make the speech in the first place. Thus, 
citizens would be less likely to be harmed, and breaches of the 
peace would be less likely to occur. Lastly, reconsidering the 
framework of the fighting words doctrine would mean that those 
who rightfully deserve legal consequences for inciteful speech 
would be punished. Under the current doctrine, which limits the 
scope of fighting words speech to what would universally incite 
violence, racially-biased inflammatory speech is constitutionally 
protected, even though contemporary standards would consider 
this speech to be capable of inciting violence. In short, it is in the 
state’s interest to alter the scope of the fighting words doctrine.
Objections
One set of possible objections to this argument is that there 
is potential danger in placing too much value on the specific 
contexts of free speech. An extreme example might be 
someone stating: “I don’t believe in God” in a radically 
religious community. According to that individual, applying 
the community standards of their specific demographic, in 
this case, religion, it may be reasonable to expect that people 
would respond violently, as such utterances are considered 
blasphemous. Most people would argue that any reasonable 
person would not react violently to this speech, but the idea of 
contemporary community standards that allow room for specific 
contexts means that even extreme community standards would 
be constitutionally protected. Additionally, in reference to the 
devolution of language, it can be argued that the prevalence 
of harmful language actually sensitizes individuals rather than 
hardens them. As a result, people may become more reckless 
when it comes to inflammatory speech, making it more likely 
that individuals will react violently to targeted language. Lastly, 
particularly in comparison to language used at the time of the 
Chaplinsky case. As a result of an increase in the prevalence of 
vulgar and offensive speech, people have become accustomed and 
hardened to it, so that it is less likely that they will react violently 
to any language used at all. Language has devolved such that 
there is a greater sense of indifference to harmful speech, and the 
standard for speech that is offensive enough to provoke violence 
has changed. Social movements have also played a role in this 
change. Now more than ever are individuals more conscious 
about their identity in terms of the unique aspects that define 
their character and experience, such as their racial background. 
Considering how race is so tied to one’s political, economic, 
and social experiences, as well as the historical plight of racial 
groups specifically, it is reasonable that it would be so integral 
to one’s identity that if one is insulted egregiously based on their 
race, they would react towards the speaker with violence. Both 
language and individuals’ sense of identity have shifted, and it is 
pertinent that the fighting words doctrine be adapted accordingly.
 There are also several state interests and benefits in 
considering race within the fighting words doctrine. It should 
first be noted that there is little, if any, value in fighting words 
generally. There is no public utility in sanctioning the exercise 
of free speech that exists only to inflame or injure. It follows 
then, that there is little to no meaningful value in racially-biased 
speech that intends to inflame or injure to the extent that an 
addressee will be incited to respond violently. Further, it is a key 
interest of the state to promote overarching equality. The state 
has a vested interest in limiting free speech which is racially 
biased and inflammatory, so that true equality can be pursued. 
Considering race within the fighting words doctrine would also 
have the effect of supporting state interests in protecting its 
citizens and maintaining the peace. If individuals were faced 
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Conclusion
Undoubtedly, there are several issues with the present fighting 
words doctrine. Prior case history such as Miller v. California 
has demonstrated that it is both possible and beneficial to alter 
the doctrine to be more context-based rather than universal – 
so that specific demographics such as race can be considered. 
Contemporary social understanding indicates that previous 
definitions of fighting words are no longer applicable, and that 
specific, targeted attacks on a person’s racial identity are among 
the only kinds of speech to which a person may reasonably 
respond with violence. The state has an interest in altering the 
doctrine, as it would support its aims to promote equality and 
maintain the peace. Ultimately, expansion of the fighting words 
doctrine would function within existing case law and balance the 
state’s interest in maintaining a marketplace of ideas in the context 
of changing social and cultural norms of acceptable discourse.
altering the fighting words doctrine might serve the state interest 
in maintaining the peace – but this is ultimately outweighed 
by the fact that it would result in viewpoint discrimination 
and a chilling effect. One side of the debate would be afforded 
protections that the other was not, and those fearing legal 
punishment would refrain from making any speech at all.
 However, these objections are problematic and can be 
countered by three contentions. First, it is wholly necessary to 
observe the intent of free speech. Regardless of how perverse 
a community’s standards may be, the original intent of speech 
is preserved when taken in the context of those standards and 
remains as a waypoint by which one can gauge if the speech 
ought to be constitutionally protected. This follows from the 
third criterion of the Miller Test, requiring consideration of the 
interest or concern of the work (or in this case, the speech) as 
a whole. Second, fighting words have nothing to do with the 
presence or absence of violence on the part of the addressee – it 
has to do with whether a person’s speech in a specific instance is 
constitutionally protected or not. Further, altering the scope of the 
doctrine to allow room for more contextual-based analysis means 
that even if people are generally more sensitive to marginalizing 
language, it will meet community standards. Third, it is once 
again necessary to point out that it has been established that 
fighting words have little, if any, social value. If there is only 
one way of expressing a viewpoint that ultimately serves to 
inflame and injure, there is not only no value in the viewpoint, 
but the viewpoint can have only negative impacts as well.
